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in this article, i examine and analyze paradigmatic conceptions of the 
family that are based upon a number of assumed primary purposes that 
the family serves for its members. in doing so, i argue that existing para-
digmatic conceptions of the family do not capture the unique primary 
purpose of the family. i then suggest that a reconceptualization of the 
family is necessary to move away from inadequate paradigmatic concep-
tions and toward a more robust conception of the family. the approach 
taken in this article requires an examination into the way(s) the family has 
been defined descriptively—specifically, how families have been defined 
historically—as a means to determine what a normative theory of the 
family might look like. the goal of this inquiry is to define the family in 
normative terms, which consequently moves the definition of the family 
to a new conceptual landscape. Last, i present my own account of familial 
relations that aims to capture a normative understanding of the unique 
primary purpose of the family.
it is challenging to identify a conception of the family that is uncontroversial, 
uncontested, or inclusive of the many diverse groups who understand themselves 
as such. the family is perhaps the most universal kind of affiliation that we have, 
while, at the same time, one of the more diverse. because the concept family 
seems at once so intimate and familiar to us, yet also so complex and contestable, 
we feel a certain way about how the family ought to be understood and what the 
family ought to stand for both personally and politically. consequently, there are 
many different interpretations of what the family should be—its desired member 
composition, its primary purpose, and its cultural significance—and many differ-
ent examples of what families actually look like across the globe. in this paper, 
i examine the most paradigmatic conceptions of the family that are based upon 
the supposed primary purpose that the family serves for its members and for the 
state. i then suggest that we ought to reconceptualize how we understand and 
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define the family in an effort to move away from these paradigmatic conceptions. 
this approach requires that we examine the way(s) in which the family has been 
defined descriptively—that is, how families have been defined historically—in 
an effort to determine what a normative theory of the family might look like. 
as such, the goal of this inquiry is to define a family in terms of what it ought 
to be—a goal that moves our understanding of the family to a new conceptual 
landscape. to this end, i ultimately present my own account of familial relations 
that aims to capture a normative understanding of the unique primary purpose 
that the family serves for its members.
1. Methodological Devices
i adopt two starting points for examining the conception of the family that are 
the most promising for identifying its characteristics and meeting basic moral 
principles. First, i start with the assumption that a family is a social group. this 
is not a very controversial assumption; many philosophers have claimed that the 
family is, in fact, a paradigmatic social group.1
 Social groups are comprised of members who knowingly share a common 
feature with one another—a belief, a value, a practice, and the like—that differ-
entiates one social group from another.2 Social groups are not mere aggregates of 
individuals that may inadvertently share some common feature with one another, 
such as biological markers (eye color, height, genes, diseases), location, or the 
like.3 as with many social groups, a family is comprised of a certain number of 
group members—family members—who knowingly share some common feature 
with one another. this leads to my next methodological premise: We can only 
determine what differentiates social groups by identifying the primary purpose that 
guides each of them. identifying the primary purpose of a social group brings the 
shared beliefs, values, practices, and so on, to the forefront of group identification. 
this approach is significant because it proposes a clear criterion—purpose—to 
distinguish social groups from mere aggregates of individuals who do not know-
ingly share whatever feature they may have in common. additionally, because 
social group members knowingly share some common feature(s), they must be 
committed to continue to share the common feature(s) with one another, or else 
the social group would dissolve.4 identifying the primary purpose of a social 
group, then, furnishes us with the ability to differentiate between social groups 
and ascertain their trajectories.
 i propose that we understand the family as a unique social group with a 
particular primary purpose—to provide care in intimate settings for the mutual 
flourishing of all family members. the important point to note here is that the 
objective for using primary purpose as a means for differentiation is to distinguish 
between different kinds of social groups, and not strictly as a means to distinguish 
one individual social group from another. by this, i mean that individual families 
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may each be said to share the primary purpose of providing care in intimate set-
tings for the mutual flourishing of all family members, yet we would not say that 
they altogether comprise one indiscriminate social group; there are other means 
to distinguish between individual families even if they all share the same primary 
purpose.5 What i aim to do here is to provide a means of distinguishing families 
from other kinds of social groups by identifying the primary purpose of each 
kind of social group. For instance, it may be the case that the primary purpose of 
a group of stamp collectors is to collect stamps, and through this process, they 
all come to intimately care for one another. We would not identify the group of 
stamp collectors by their intimate caring relations; we would instead say that 
this particular group of stamp collectors seem to be engaged in some intimate 
caring relations. however, if these intimate caring relations were to become the 
paramount or primary reason the group members engaged with one another, i 
would argue that they have ceased to be a group of stamp collectors and may 
now be considered a family (a family that also happens to collect stamps).6 
hence, the primacy of intimate caring relations found within the family is what 
distinguishes it from other kinds of social groups. that being said, it may be the 
case that colloquial definitions of the family allow for the family to have other 
purposes because families are created and maintained for other purposes. i turn 
now to discuss three distinct primary purposes that have been historically and 
philosophically prevalent in conceptualizing the family. ultimately, i conclude 
that none of the three discussed primary purposes is sufficient for distinguishing 
the family from other social groups; hence, none of them captures the unique 
primary purpose of the family.
2. the purpose of the Family
historically, there have been two prevailing reasons that have been given to justify 
the creation and maintenance of families. the first suggests that economic con-
siderations yield family commitments: persons come together and form economic 
unions to protect private property and ensure that their assets are passed down to 
particular others.7 the second suggests that doctrines of perpetuation and expan-
sion of systematic beliefs influence who we choose to commit to, and shape our 
desires to pass our beliefs and traditions to others.8 i will argue that, while both 
kinds of commitment schemes do lead to the genesis and maintenance of social 
groups, neither approach accurately captures the unique kind of commitment that 
defines familial commitment and, hence, neither approach actually characterizes a 
family. it is important to note that i am proposing that we understand the family 
as being normatively defined by its primary purpose, which serves to establish 
what makes the family a unique social group. this means that other colloquial 
definitions of the family may not always satisfy the normative criteria that i will 
specify and, in turn, they may not sufficiently pick out anything unique about the 
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family. to avoid potential confusion, we may call these non-normative families 
de facto families.
 economic and political considerations have influenced de facto familial arrange-
ments for hundreds of years. in such cases, the boundary between who counts 
as a family member and who does not count as a family member is determined 
by marriage or child rearing, or legal contracts that specify such relationships 
between individuals. While such economic considerations especially may have 
drastically negative consequences, especially for young females in forced mar-
riages,9 a large percentage of marriages and partnerships that occurred through 
the eighteenth century were arranged for strategic reasons.10 For instance, inter-
marriage between members of royal families (often first cousins) was a means of 
solidifying political alliances and kinship ties across generations, especially when 
children were produced from such marriages.11 other economic incentives that 
have influenced the formation of families through marriage or contract (adoption 
and fostering included) involve the ability to pass property, wealth, assets, and 
health care coverage to particular others who are members of one’s family (i.e., 
transferring wealth or property to a spouse or child without paying certain taxes, 
or adding previously ineligible persons to one’s health care plan). in some cases, 
forming a family with another individual through marriage or contract is an ef-
fective means for paying lower taxes (such as qualifying for a reduced income 
tax rate as a married couple, and a further reduction for additional dependents) 
or to establish grounds for citizenship for non-citizens. these features of fami-
lies are even understood as part of the purpose of creating families by certain 
philosophers like G. W. F. hegel, who claimed that the family is represented as 
a legal person that has external reality in property; as such, hegel argued that the 
family must have property and assets to be recognized by other families and the 
state.12 So, there is much evidence and argument to support the notion that the 
family is primarily created (and sustained for a particular group of individuals) 
for economic and political reasons, with a commitment to protect social class, 
political alliance, property, and assets.
 a second consideration that has influenced the creation of de facto families 
involves the desire to promote and continue traditions and values that one holds 
dear. a doctrine of perpetuation and expansion of systematic belief is a strong 
motivator for creating and maintaining what are considered to be larger and 
more hegemonic de facto familial groups. often, this family formation process 
involves marriage or some contract-like process as well, or a religious ritual where 
one is newly recognized as bearing a certain relationship to a set of beliefs or 
traditions. For example, “placement marriages” are extremely common among 
Mormon populations, demonstrating a strong devotion to faith and a commitment 
to obtaining salvation for one’s family.13
 in less strictly arranged situations, there persists a strong ideological drive 
to pass one’s beliefs down to other family members (particularly children) that 
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heavily influences whom one chooses as a partner or whom one considers to be 
a stable member of one’s family. in this respect, passing beliefs onto other family 
members is seen as a crucial component for maintaining families. For instance, 
thomas aquinas and John Locke both argued that parents are the best educa-
tors for their own children, and parents have a right to exclusively educate their 
children and protect their interests in their own ways.14 More recently, charles 
Fried argues that parents have the right to freely form the values of their children 
and direct the development of their life plans.15 Fried claims that the family as an 
institution is maintained by the right of parents to form the values and the life plan 
of their child, and the right to lavish attention on that child. he claims that these 
are extensions of the basic right not to be interfered with in doing those things 
for oneself (in this sense, Fried deems the child to be an extension of the self/the 
parent).16 William Galston similarly argues that this is a fundamental parental 
right, claiming that parents have an “expressive interest” (via expressive liberty) 
in raising their children in a manner that is consistent with their own beliefs and 
values.17
 For both Fried and Galston, there is a special bond between parent and child 
that is based upon the significance of biological reproduction. the biological ties 
between parent and child grant parents a right to shape the values of their children 
by viewing the child as an extension of the self. in contrast, harry brighouse 
and adam Swift argue that sharing values with children lies at the heart of the 
parent-child relationship because such interactions contribute to “familial rela-
tionship goods,” and not because some deep biological connection gives parents 
a paramount right over their children.18 Despite the significance or insignificance 
of biological justification for parental rights, it is important to note that all of 
these accounts hold that there is something significant (some meaningful bond or 
intimate tie) between parents and children that makes it permissible to pass values 
on to one’s children. to this end, one might choose a co-parent who shares similar 
beliefs to impart a consistent message to one’s progeny, or one might consider 
someone else to be one’s family member only if that individual continues to 
share the same values and traditions. in such cases, a “family” is created through 
a commitment to uphold one’s beliefs and/or religious faith, and it is maintained 
through the activity of passing those beliefs, values, and traditions on to others.
 these two kinds of approaches—the argument from economic considerations 
and the argument from the perpetuation and expansion of systematic beliefs—
attempt to explain the motivating factors behind the formation of families 
historically and to provide reasons why, and activities that describe how, families 
are maintained over time. both approaches suggest a kind of conscious com-
mitment that family members make with one another at the outset and provide 
other structural commitments that seem to guide interactions between established 
family members in an effort to sustain the family.19 as such, both approaches 
entail specific primary purposes for the family: the first suggests that the primary 
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purpose of the family is based upon the commitment to preserve the relationship 
between members of the family to certain properties, assets, positions, and the 
like from one generation to the next; the second suggests that the primary purpose 
of the family is based upon the commitment to promote and pass down values 
from one generation to the next. While both commitment schemes are sufficient 
for the genesis and maintenance of a social group (both involve members who 
knowingly share some common feature with one another—either a relationship 
to property and/or assets, or a particular doctrine of faith or belief system), nei-
ther one is sufficient for creating a family because neither commitment scheme 
is uniquely familial—that is, families may certainly share some of these beliefs, 
relationships, or practices, but none of them is sufficient to uniquely pick out 
what it is that makes a family a family, and not just some other social group.
 in the first case, a social group (“a family”) is formed either with the establish-
ment of legally recognized claims on certain property and assets, or through the 
designation that a particular group of individuals stands in a particular relation to 
a social or political position (i.e., the throne of england). additionally, “a family” 
may be maintained in this case by upholding these legal claims and titles and ex-
tending them to future generations. While a commitment to particular others who 
all have some relation to specific property or to a set of assets signifies a cohesive 
group, there is nothing uniquely familial about this commitment.20 corporations 
often have board members and/or shareholders that stand in a particular relation 
to shared property or assets, yet we would not want to call these individuals fam-
ily members. Similarly, cabinet members may stand in a particular relation to a 
specific political position (i.e., the vice president succeeds the president if the 
president is unable to serve, and so forth), yet we would not want to call these 
officials family members. as such, a commitment to protect shared property and 
assets or to solidify political alliance or social position is not sufficient for defin-
ing the family because such commitments can be made by other non-familial 
groups as well. While it may be the case that families do protect shared property 
and assets and preserve social position—that is, the family may indeed play a 
specific role in economic life—this cannot be the primary purpose that the family 
serves, or else the family would be indistinguishable from other social groups that 
have the same primary purpose for their members. hence, this proposed primary 
purpose fails to identify anything unique about the family.
 What about the second case? is a commitment to uphold one’s beliefs and/or 
religious faith, and to pass those beliefs, values, and traditions down to future gen-
erations a sufficient condition for creating and maintaining a family? the choice to 
form a family with individuals who share our values and beliefs—in essence, the 
choice to restrict our possible choices for potential family members—is certainly 
significant, as is the desire to pass on dearly held beliefs, values, and traditions 
to those with whom we want to continue to share family membership. We do not 
choose blindly, so there must be something unique about the relationship between 
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shared values and the groups we form and maintain—and there is, although it 
is not uniquely familial. these beliefs, values, and traditions can be shared with 
extremely large social groups such as congregations, communities, and nations.21 
For such large groups, it is not necessary for each member to know one another 
personally to know that all of the members of a congregation or community share 
a particular set of beliefs, values, and traditions, and a desire to pass them onto 
others, and that they regularly participate in practices that do pass those beliefs, 
values, and traditions on to others.22 in other words, a commitment to uphold 
beliefs, values, and traditions does not require a close connection among group 
members who share the commitment. this fact runs afoul of the way we think 
about the family and the accounts of the family discussed above—namely, that 
there is a special bond among family members, and this bond is not extended to 
a large number of people.23
 to return to the discussion involving shared values and familial bonding, brig-
house and Swift argue that it is not merely the sharing of beliefs or values that 
creates or perpetuates the value of parent-child interactions; value-shaping and 
value-sharing interactions between parents and children contribute to a healthy, 
loving relationship between parent and child only because of the level of inti-
macy and vulnerability involved in such interactions.24 in many instances, parents 
who try to shape the values of their children do so because they care about their 
children and sincerely believe that their children will be harmed, or that their 
quality of life will suffer, if they do not come to value the same things.25 Further, 
parents who share their values are sharing intimate facts about themselves—their 
core beliefs, desires, and the like—that they most likely do not share with many 
others. as children grow and develop their own values (provided they are being 
raised in a healthy, respectful environment), parents may find their values chal-
lenged or rebuked. in such cases, without some other shared commitment to keep 
family members together, it is not difficult to think that parent and child would 
grow apart, perhaps severing familial ties. this trajectory seems wrong; parents 
and children do have disagreements about fundamental beliefs (for example, a 
belief versus non-belief in a God, or a belief versus non-belief in allowing for 
reproductive choice), yet familial relationships often remain intact. Further, such 
a strong emphasis on value sharing seems to discount the intimacy that created 
the opportunity for such value sharing in the first place.
 additionally, some of the beliefs held by group members may be harmful to 
other members (such as the belief that abortion is wrong even in cases of rape, 
incest, or a threat to the mother’s life) or may not be in the best interest of all 
members (such as the belief that certain persons should not be allowed to marry 
based on sexual orientation). these beliefs may oppress certain group members 
and diminish a group member’s quality of life. if the family were to be based 
primarily on the commitment to promote a shared system of values and beliefs, 
then it would allow for potential oppression and domination within familial 
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relationships to exist unchallenged, as family members would not rebuke harm-
ful behaviors that are prescribed by the belief system.26 this goes against what 
many consider to be the strengths of the familial relationships: a more robust 
level of trust, concern for well-being, desire to see members flourish, and sense 
of solidarity, as compared with the relationships we find ourselves in outside of 
the family.27 it further emphasizes the fact that such a conception of the family 
does not point to a unique characteristic of the family; oppression and domination 
that results from the promotion of a shared belief system often happens outside 
of the family as well.
 With respect to this last point in particular, one may worry that the proposed 
method for determining the definition of the family seems to be conflating what 
the family ought to be with what the family is descriptively. For instance, stick-
ing to the conceptual scheme at work in most definitions of the family, we would 
characterize the examples in the previous paragraph as portraying something like 
an oppressive family—that is, as an instantiation of a bad family, but a family 
nonetheless. in contrast, the account i am proposing here threatens to erase any 
means for distinguishing between good families and bad families by conceptu-
ally eradicating the category “bad family.” Specifically, my account holds that an 
oppressive family is no family at all since it does not realize the primary purpose 
of the family: to provide care in intimate settings for the mutual flourishing of all 
family members. but shouldn’t we just call this oppressive group a bad family? 
Why think of it as no family at all?
 the ability to distinguish bad families from good families, based upon some 
set of criteria, has been historically valuable for theorizing about ways to encour-
age better familial relations and ways to address problematic familial relations.28 
however, by preserving the category of “family” indiscriminately, we conflate the 
acceptability of all kinds of familial relationships, be they caring and respectful, 
or abusive and neglectful, in virtue of the fact that these are all families. hence, 
traditional descriptive conceptions of the family serve, in a practical sense, to 
preserve morally problematic relations and groups because members of those 
groups justify their continued problematic relations with one another by appeal-
ing to some notion of family that exists independently of the quality of familial 
relations. as such, individuals are tempted to remain in what we currently term 
“bad families” because we have a flawed understanding of what a family is. by 
contrast, my account suggests that individuals who are members of these collo-
quially defined “bad families” ought not consider their group a family, but rather 
a group of individuals who fancy themselves a “family” but aren’t fulfilling the 
proper function—the primary purpose—of a family.
 in light of this discussion, a commitment among individuals to uphold and 
promote shared beliefs, values, and traditions does not sufficiently conceptualize 
a unique characteristic of the family because (1) such commitments are made and 
upheld on much larger scales, (2) the degree of impersonality that occurs on a 
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larger scale discounts the intimacy that we associate with the family, and (3) the 
possibility for shared beliefs and behaviors to negatively affect members’ lives is 
at odds with the family being a safe haven from uncaring and harmful behaviors.
 at this point, we have challenged the acceptability of the argument from eco-
nomic considerations and the argument from the perpetuation and expansion of 
systematic beliefs for the genesis and maintenance of the family, despite their 
acceptability for the genesis and maintenance of social groups more generally. 
before turning to one last methodological objection, i want to briefly discuss one 
more suggested purpose that the family allegedly serves: producing and rearing 
children to become future citizens with particular characteristics desired by the 
state. this type of argument is typically rooted in the importance of the right 
kind of moral development and the duty of parents (or guardians) to instill the 
right moral sentiments in their children. it might strike one as a similar kind of 
argument to the significance of passing one’s beliefs down to one’s children, but 
it is important to note that the goal for value shaping differs for the production 
of future citizens.
 Several accounts of the family hold that the primary purpose of the family lies 
with the production and rearing of children who possess the right moral senti-
ments to become concerned, cooperative citizens. For some philosophers, the 
family serves as the primary and most important foundation from which moral 
development toward citizenship occurs, with parents who instill the correct be-
liefs (in God, in love, in cooperation and orienting oneself for tasks that satisfy 
the group rather than just the individual) until their children come of age and are 
considered independent citizens in their own right.29 on these accounts, families 
are rendered complete with the creation of children and are essentially terminated 
once the children become independent citizens.
 other accounts hold that the right moral sentiments (the correct moral psy-
chology) are instilled in children through the right kind of relationship with their 
parents.30 these accounts hold that a stable and loving environment provides 
children with tendencies to develop empathy toward fellow citizens when they 
reach adulthood. the purpose of raising one’s children on these accounts is not 
so much the creation of the citizen, but the creation of citizens of a certain kind 
that will lead to an overall just state.
 Despite the loftier primary purpose of the family on these accounts, the goal 
for child rearing and care should not be oriented toward the production of citizens 
nor toward the production of a certain type of citizen. Such a suggested purpose 
tasks the family with something dictated outside of the family—namely, producing 
and maintaining certain kinds of citizens who will behave in the appropriate way 
outside of the family. in doing so, the family becomes merely one among several 
institutions for civic education, along with schools, the military, and various civil 
service programs and proposals.31 While it may be the case that families do cre-
ate occasions for value sharing and value shaping, and this may indeed be one 
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purpose that the family serves for its members, it cannot be the primary purpose, 
for it fails to identify anything unique about the family.
 Rather, the primary purpose of the family should originate from the family and 
for the sake of the family; specifically, the primary purpose of the family ought 
to be something that only pertains to the functioning of the family as a social 
group independent of all other purposes that the family might serve in different 
contexts. the primary purpose of the family may guide the other purposes that 
the family serves (i.e., it may influence how property and assets are distributed, 
or what kinds of beliefs and values are shared), but the primary purpose cannot 
itself be guided by other purposes.
 primary purposes that are assigned to the family that either originate outside 
of the family (such as the relationship to property or to citizenship production) 
or that have no unique bearing on the identity of the family (such as religious 
belief) are not satisfactory for defining the family as a social group, nor are they 
necessary for the maintenance of the family over time. as we have seen, these 
other purposes do not point to anything that is unique about the family, and they 
do not provide us with an adequate understanding of why family members remain 
committed to one another as a family over the long term, as opposed to some 
other kind of social group. Further, if these suggested purposes should guide the 
trajectory of the family, then negative consequences may occur for certain family 
members who are oppressed by harmful beliefs or swindled out of their assets. 
We are left with the need for a more adequate conception of the family that is 
based upon a unique primary purpose that the family serves for its members. i 
will introduce my proposal for the primary purpose of the family in section 4 of 
this paper, but i must address one more objection first.
3. isn’t the Family a biological Group?
Many accounts of the family emphasize biological relatedness as the main 
component of what determines familial status among a group of persons.32 our 
biological connection to particular others is seen as the definitive criterion for 
determining current family members, past family members, and soon-to-be family 
members. our legal understanding of the family and the legal proceedings that 
follow from such an understanding place biological connection as one of the main 
ways to determine familial groups and the corresponding rights that accompany 
them. biological relation is indeed important—“family” histories of chronic 
diseases, degenerative illnesses, medical complications, allergies, and the like 
are important (if not essential) pieces of information for those who are struggling 
to identify certain symptoms, to prevent complications associated with medical 
procedures, or to begin precautionary screenings for cancers, dementia-related 
illnesses, heart conditions, and so on. however, biology itself is not a marker for 
determining familial connection in the qualitative sense. that is, biology, as i 
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will argue, is not a determinant or catalyst for how much we care for others, or 
for reciprocal attitudes/affection, or for the possession of similar beliefs, and it is 
certainly not a determinant for whether two or more persons should be encour-
aged to cohabitate and provide for one another.
 Drawing familial affiliation boundaries primarily from biological relatedness 
is rather open-ended. biological siblings, for instance, share a significant number 
of genes and phenotypic features (they may even share a very similar set of genes 
if they are identical twins). however, to say that their biological similarity is the 
defining feature of their familial affiliation, bonding, or concern for one another 
is specious. the siblings may look extremely different from one another, or they 
may be affected by different illnesses, allergies, or predispositions to certain 
conditions (especially if their levels of physical activity differ or they follow 
different diets). as such, the siblings may not be able to donate organs or blood 
to one another despite their shared genetic material (the same may be the case 
between parents and children, who often have different blood types and suffer 
from different ailments).33 Given these variations, we must ask: Which biological 
features are the significant ones for familial affiliation? eye color? blood type? 
Skin color? a shared predisposition to develop cancer? Since (1) these features 
can vary so much even between extremely closely biologically related persons, 
and (2) these features can be shared with non-familial persons as well (eye color, 
skin color, chronic ailment or disability, and so on), it is problematic to give so 
much weight to biological relatedness as the sole criterion for determining familial 
affiliation.
 even if we were to use biology to determine familial affiliation, when are 
“relevant” biological connections identified, and when are they not? Do we stop 
with grandparents, second cousins, or great-great-great-great-uncles? Should 
we maintain comprehensive records of every single person that we share even 
a minimal amount of genetic material with and consider those persons family 
members? For some, the answer is yes—family lineage is an extremely significant 
mark of one’s identity.34 however, those who do successfully trace their lineage 
throughout history (those who are fortunate enough to have public records on 
those historical relations) are not tracing anything qualitative about their relation-
ships with those genetic historical relations—that is, they are not tracing anything 
intimate between themselves and their relations.35 instead, they are tracing lines 
of prestige, lines of ownership in relation to specific pieces of property, or per-
haps the prevalence of a certain skill, trade, or line of work that historical genetic 
relations all participated in (professional musicians, blacksmithing, membership 
in the armed forces, and so on). those kinds of traits, as i have argued above, are 
not sufficient for designating familial status.36 While certain benefits may come 
through inheritances based upon these identity claims and appeals to biology, 
we might argue that those benefits are not deserved and should not be conferred 
if no qualitative relationship has occurred.37
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 Some philosophers, however, do hold that biology is an important component 
in the formation and maintenance of qualitative relationships. as discussed above, 
charles Fried and William Galston both hold that there is a special bond between 
family members (parent and child especially) that is based upon the significance 
of biological reproduction. these philosophers argue that the reason why we 
develop caring attitudes and affinity toward our family members is because we 
are related to them biologically—that somehow, biology has the power to create 
special bonds between family members.38 For instance, Fried writes:
there is evidence that there are pervasive physiological changes of great 
subtlety associated with pregnancy and birth. thus—motherhood is an ex-
perience which has persistent, biological roots and is not just a voluntary or 
customary social bond imposed upon the contingently prior fact of birth—it 
is not as if separating the breeding and the rearing functions could neverthe-
less yield an unaltered experience of parenthood. Rather, the physical facts 
are importantly implicated in the resulting social bond.39
Similarly, hegel argues that children complete an incomplete family; spouses 
attain objective unity only through the creation of their children, as children 
represent the objective expression of their parents’ spiritual union.40 this view 
is problematic for several reasons. First, it limits (or even downright excludes) 
the possibility for parents of adoptive children to ever form meaningful or lasting 
bonds with those children, since the “special tie” that would form between them 
would need some sort of underlying biological connection (and in the case of 
giving birth and nursing, it may even preclude fathers from developing as deep a 
bond with their children as the mother does simply through her biological activi-
ties). this discounts the intimate relationships that adoptive parents (and even 
fathers) form with their children, especially when those parents fight to protect 
those relationships in custody disputes.41
 Second, it presupposes that biology controls the way that we feel about 
particular others and dictates the level of care/concern/affection that we show 
to particular others. it is evident that biologically related persons need not feel 
warmly for one another; just take a look at any television show, news broadcast, or 
famous literary work that depicts the myriad ways in which members of biologi-
cally defined families despise one another, scheme and bamboozle one another, 
plot against one another, and so forth. even worse, there is (unfortunately) a 
multitude of evidence that biology is no indicator for how family members treat 
one another—cases of abuse, rape, oppression, and even murder occur on a regular 
basis between biologically defined family members, especially between parents 
and their biological children.42
 Recognizing the shortcomings of the biological relatedness argument, my 
account maintains that families ought to be considered social groups precisely 
because of the importance of the qualitative aspects of familial relations and not 
because of any shared biological features between family members. biology 
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certainly has the ability to ontologically carve out different groups of individuals—
for instance, biological assessment can identify those who have type 1 diabetes, 
or those who have cystic fibrosis, or (especially in Western societies) those who 
have certain skin colors as opposed to others, and can separate those persons into 
different groups. however, biology is neither a necessary nor sufficient condi-
tion for demarcating families in the significant sense that inspires the benefits 
we confer upon them. the benefits that are conferred upon families by states 
are social benefits: recognition of the sociality of the family ought to ground the 
way that these benefits are conferred and what end(s) they are intended to serve. 
they are benefits that make it easier for family members to care for one another, 
provide for one another, to see one another regularly, and to encourage all family 
members to grow, develop, and flourish.
 Social benefits are benefits that appertain to the relationships between indi-
viduals because they affect the functioning of those relationships. as such, social 
benefits only have meaning when applied to relationships—most integrally, 
familial relationships—and cannot be applied to individuals apart from their rela-
tionships (for instance, one cannot have visitation rights in a hospital or prison if 
there is no known relation to visit). these kinds of benefits are typically extended 
beyond those to whom we are merely biologically related already; for instance, 
in the united States, these benefits are often conferred on our spouses, adopted 
children, stepchildren, domestic partners, foster families, and so on. Since these 
social connections are already recognized as significantly shaping familial mem-
bership, and the benefits already conferred upon families are associated with the 
relationships between individuals, the family ought to be recognized as a social 
group. because social groups have shared goals and beliefs and the like in place, 
it is important to determine what particular goal(s) family members share with 
one another that make them a family and not some other social group.
4. care as primary purpose
having examined claims against the argument from the production and rearing 
of future citizens and the argument from biological relatedness, in addition to 
the argument from economic considerations and the argument from the perpetu-
ation and expansion of systematic belief, we are now ready to identify a more 
adequate conception of the family that is based upon a unique primary purpose 
that the family serves for its members. i propose that we conceive of the family 
normatively, as a social group that is based upon a commitment to interdependent 
caring relations and the fulfillment of mutual well-being through those relations. 
the remainder of this paper will defend this proposal and suggest that a com-
mitment to interdependency and the fulfillment of mutual well-being through 
interdependent caring relations is a unique, necessary, and sufficient condition to 
generate and maintain the family, and, as such, adequately defines it.43
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 all human beings are dependent for many years of their lives, especially when 
they are infants and young children. care theorists recognize that dependency is a 
universal feature of the first years of our lives, yet they also stress the fact that depen-
dency does not necessarily end with childhood. Rather, they argue that dependency 
is experienced in various forms throughout one’s life. Whether it is because they are 
chronically disabled, injured, have fallen ill, or have aged beyond self-sufficiency, 
human beings find themselves in states of dependency throughout their lives and 
therefore—at best—periodically require care at different times (though it is worth 
noting that persons might also want to be cared for in less pressing situations). in 
light of this fact, i argue that the family is the best place for that care to be provided.44
 there already exists an assumption that families should be geared toward some 
long-term goals, and this account holds a similar assumption.45 because of the 
nature of care—what it means to be a caring person, what a good caring relation-
ship looks like, and what purpose caring activity serves—it is evident that the 
best scenario for caring relationships is one in which care is given and received 
in the long term. Joan tronto argues that care involves thought and action—it 
involves a certain amount of knowledge about those for whom we provide care, 
and necessitates that those who care for us have a similar level of knowledge about 
us.46 this kind of knowledge can only be gained through intimate relationships 
that are maintained and enhanced over time. So, there is something unique about 
the kind of caring relationships that happen between those who are intimately 
connected over long periods of time. Given these characteristics about the nature 
of care and caring relations, i argue that the primary purpose of the family is to 
create and maintain these caring relations between family members because it is 
an ideal arrangement for persons to care for and receive care from one another.
 this conception of the family is meant to challenge those views of the de facto 
family that (either intentionally or unintentionally) preserve problematic relation-
ships in the name of biological relatedness or for some insufficient primary purpose, 
such as religious perpetuation and expansion, as discussed above. it is also meant 
to challenge the notion that our family members are a determinate set of individu-
als regardless of the quality of our relations with them. as argued earlier in this 
paper, traditional descriptive conceptions of the family serve to preserve morally 
problematic groups and relations by keeping persons tethered to one another in 
abusive, neglectful, or oppressive situations by virtue of the designation of “family” 
on the group. yes, these descriptive conceptions enable us to distinguish between 
“good” and “bad” families, but they do so at the cost of preserving “bad families” 
in perpetuity. My proposed account enables persons to form, maintain, or join fami-
lies throughout their lives. it also gives persons the ability to revise their familial 
relationships if they are not receiving (or giving) adequate primary care, because 
families are less rigidly defined in terms of biology and procreation.
 this last point strikes a tense chord with traditional theories of care that argue 
that most of our relationships to other family members are completely unchosen 
PAQ 33_1 text.indd   78 1/15/19   11:08 AM
© Copyright 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. No part of this article may be 
reproduced, photocopied, posted online, or distributed through any means without the permission of the University of Illinois Press.
 What iS a FaMiLy? 79
for many years of our lives. care theorists argue that these unchosen relationships 
shape us in significant ways (our demeanor, beliefs, values, and so on) before we 
are typically given the choice to revise our familial relations. Further, when we 
do revise those relations, we do so having been heavily affected by those initial 
familial relations, so we often don’t change the kinds of familial relations that 
we have in a substantial way.47
 however much we may be shaped by our upbringings and circumstances, Vir-
ginia held argues that we are not constrained by them; the relations that we are 
enmeshed in are capable of being reshaped or changed when necessary.48 When 
we do reshape or change our existing relations, we act with the desire of having 
better and more caring relations—that is, we replace existing relationships with 
other, better relationships.49 While we may not be able to choose all of our family 
members at a given time, we are certainly able to revise our caring relationships 
over time to reflect the kinds of familial relationships that we want, which may 
involve dissolving some (un)caring relationships that we feel are harmful. this does 
not mean that we go off on our own, completely independent, and without need of 
caring relationships. Rather, we gain the ability to choose what kinds of relation-
ship we are going to be a part of as we grow: we may choose to stay a part of the 
family that we were born into, or choose to join a different family that welcomes 
us, or we may choose to start a new family with others who are similarly situated.50
 that being said, it may not be possible to completely distance ourselves from 
individuals with whom we’ve previously had caring (or uncaring) relationships.51 
For example, we may hold some affinity for biological siblings, parents, aunts, 
uncles, and the like, especially if they have been a significant presence in our lives. 
We may still care about them. however, if (at best) we are not actively caring for 
them and they are not actively caring for us, i contend that the familial relation-
ship has ceased. We might then say, for example, that we have a “brother
b
” (to 
mark our biological brother), who is no longer (or perhaps has never been) our 
“brother
s
”—our social brother, which would signify that there is no active care 
and no recognized family relationship.52
 a conceptual analysis of the family that is drawn from the ways we have histori-
cally conceived of it may find this account controversial, for it requires not only 
that we move away from historical and biological conceptions of the family, but 
that we reconceptualize what we mean when we call a social group a family. as 
we have seen, the reconceptualization i have proposed has the potential to shift 
the boundaries between what we have historically considered to be families and 
what i am now suggesting we consider to be families. Despite the unease some 
may have with this reconceptualization project, i contend that it is necessary 
both for arriving at a more ethical understanding of what the family is and for 
determining how best to confer social benefits on families so that they are used 
in ways that benefit all family members. that being said, there is one potential 
objection to this account that warrants a response here.53
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 With respect to the knowledge requirement i have specified above, one may 
ask: if individuals are only members of families as long as, and inasmuch as, 
they have knowledge about other members’ needs, what about apparent family 
members who seem incapable of having such knowledge? Despite the fact that 
social philosophers often herald the family as a paradigmatic social group (even 
apart from arguments made herein), the family presents an interesting challenge 
to notions of collective intentionality and the makeup of social groups because 
of the kinds of members it has—namely, infants, children, and the cognitively 
disabled—who seem incapable of intentionality.
 as mentioned earlier in this paper, social philosophers define social groups as 
being comprised of members who knowingly share a common feature with one 
another—a belief, a value, a practice, and the like.54 this epistemological condi-
tion, built into the concept of a social group, rests upon a narrow conception of 
agency that is difficult to extend beyond able-minded autonomous adults. Families, 
however, are often comprised of members who supposedly lack this developed 
sense of agency and are therefore considered incapable of consenting to join or 
remain in a group. infants, small children, and the cognitively disabled present a 
problem for the view that family members ought to have some knowledge about 
one another, especially in caregiving and care receiving contexts. What are we 
to make of supposed family members who we do not think have the agency to 
satisfy this knowledge requirement?
 carol Gould suggests that agency be understood as a relational concept with 
two distinct senses: basic agency, understood as open and inclusive, and developed 
agency, understood as the development or flourishing of one’s basic agency.55 a 
basic sense of agency consists in intentionality or choice as a feature of human ac-
tion, and is evident in human life activity as a mode or way of being. a developed 
sense of agency is characterized by the exercise of this basic agency shown by the 
increase in capacities or the realization of long-term projects or goals—taking both 
individual and collective forms—that is a process over time. a developed sense 
of agency presupposes the capacity for choosing, making it possible for the basic 
sense of agency to remain open to infants, children, and the cognitively disabled.56
 Gould is not alone in thinking that infants, children, and the cognitively disabled 
are capable of displaying some form of agency. in a similar vein, Joan tronto 
mentions that care receivers often try to reciprocate the care that they receive, 
arguing that even small infants try to return care to their caregivers.57 Likewise, 
Raimo tuomela, drawing upon Michael tomasello’s research, claims that young 
children are capable of agency and, therefore, of we-mode thinking.58 So, this 
worry, while well-placed, is not nearly as restrictive as one would imagine. Despite 
arguments here that most family members have some level of agency, family in 
the sense that i understand it could exist even if some members have no agency 
at all. Families as social groups remain open to all kinds of members, so long as 
they participate in intimate caring relations with one another.
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5. conclusion
the family, in the normative sense that i intend to argue for, is a social group 
created and maintained by the goal of nurturing the well-being of all family 
members and the family unit as a whole. When it is recognized that we are all 
in need of care, and when our desire for caring relations makes clear how much 
we value care in our day-to-day lives, we seek to form, maintain, or enhance 
caring relations with others who also recognize and value caring relations. Since 
families are not often newly created, but are groups that have expanding and 
contracting memberships over time, families are maintained by joint activity 
that works toward the shared goal of mutual well-being over the long term. if 
all family members engage in caring relations with one another, they all actively 
and interdependently work toward improving the well-being of each member. 
Since the establishment of caring relations is the shared value amongst family 
members, in order to keep the family going, a commitment to honor that shared 
value is necessary.
 hence, the family as a social group should not be defined by some inadvertent 
common feature that is shared by its members, such as a relation to property or 
some shared Dna. Rather, the family is a social group because of the purpose 
that guides the family and elucidates the relationship between its members: the 
commitment of its members to provide active care in intimate settings over the 
long term. Further, this purpose is unique to the family and, as a necessary and 
sufficient condition, contributes toward a clear conception of the family that, 
when recognized by the state, will help to shape policies that are better suited to 
address the actual needs of families: those social benefits, conferred by the state, 
that make it easier for family members to care for one another.
University of Tampa
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1. See bratman (Faces of Intention); see Gilbert (On Social Facts; Theory of Political 
Obligation; see tuomela (Philosophy of Sociality).
2. Margaret Gilbert’s account of social groups specifies that those who act together 
as a group understand themselves to be parties to a commitment of some shared belief, 
value, practice, or the like (Sociality and Responsibility, 158). in this sense, individuals 
constitute a social group if and only if each of them thinks of himself or herself and the 
others as a “we” who share in some action, belief, attitude, or some similar attribute 
(Gilbert, On Social Facts, 204).
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3. Greenwood (“Social Facts”).
4. a commitment to continue sharing the common feature(s) need not always 
involve self-conscious activity that expressly manifests the commitment, but can also 
be embodied in the practices that originate from the group purpose. consider a social 
group comprised of stamp collectors. the members knowingly share a similar feature 
(collecting stamps) with one another that stems from the group purpose (to collect 
stamps) and perhaps engage in a practice that originates from the shared feature (they 
meet regularly to discuss and trade stamps). Should the members stop collecting stamps, 
they would no longer have a reason to engage in the practice of discussing and trading 
stamps, and we would be right to say that the social group of stamp collectors had dis-
solved.
5. For example, families may be distinguished by their individual member composi-
tions: family X is comprised of member A, member B, and member C, while family Y is 
comprised of member D, member E, and member F.
6. We can see how this conceptual scheme applies to other kinds of groups—for 
instance, religious initiates like nuns, priests, monks, and the like—who may similarly 
come to engage in intimate caring relations with one another. So long as their primary 
reason for engaging with one another is for some reason other than caring relations, they 
do not constitute a family.
7. coontz (Marriage, a History); van Leeuwen, Maas, and Miles (Marriage Choices); 
hegel (Elements); engels (Origin of the Family).
8. Watson (“1948 Secret Marriage”); Fried (Right and Wrong); Galston (Liberal 
Pluralism).
9. Forced marriages differ from arranged marriages in that at least one party to the 
marriage does not consent to the arrangement. typically, forced marriages involve a young 
female (sometimes as young as 5 years old) forcibly betrothed or married to a male of a 
wealthier or more prestigious family for the economic benefit of the female’s family (i.e., 
bride price or bridewealth). See beswick (“We are bought”); Freeman (“transforming 
human Rights”).
10. coontz (Marriage, a History).
11. van Leeuwen, Maas, and Miles (Marriage Choices). Friedrich engels writes that 
for a knight, baron, or prince, marriage is a political act; it is an opportunity to increase 
power through new alliances (engels, Origin of the Family, 141).
12. hegel, Elements, § 169.
13. Watson (“1948 Secret Marriage”).
14. Gutmann (Democratic Education).
15. Fried (Right and Wrong).
16. in this sense, the argument for passing values onto—and shaping the values of— 
one’s progeny relies on two premises. the first premise is that biological ties between 
parents and children specify some paramount right over children by their parents, and the 
second is that there is a special bond between parents and children that is based upon the 
facts of biological reproduction. Society has no right to choose the values of a child, but 
the values must come from somewhere (Fried, Right and Wrong, 154). the child does 
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not belong to the community, but to the mother, and this enlarges the mother’s autonomy 
to develop autonomy in her offspring through the shaping of values that express the per-
sonality of the mother (or the parents in general) (Fried, Right and Wrong, 155).
17. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 94. it is important to note that the enforcement of this 
right is weaker for Galston, as he maintains only that parents raise children in a way that 
is consistent with the children’s own values as opposed to imbuing the children with the 
parents’ values.
18. harry brighouse and adam Swift argue that value-shaping interactions between 
parents and children (those interactions where parents deliberately try to steer their chil-
dren to adopt certain values over others) that are done with the purpose of benefitting 
their children are indefensible under that particular description, yet they are justified on 
the different grounds that value sharing and value-shaping contribute to a healthy, lov-
ing relationship between parent and child (Family Values, 152). interestingly, a paradox 
arises in that, by sharing values and shaping the values of their children, parents actually 
do benefit their children (with respect to familial relationship goods).
19. these conscious commitments take the form of legal contracts, political or dip-
lomatic agreements, participation in religious ceremonies, and the like.
20. one may object that the role of the family does differ with respect to economic 
arrangements, in that it serves as the primary model for the acquisition and perpetua-
tion of private property that corporations have subsequently followed. eleanor burke 
Leacock writes that, for Friedrich engels, “the separation of the family from the clan 
and the institution of monogamous marriage were the social expression of developing 
private property; so-called monogamy afforded the means through which property could 
be individually inherited. and private property for some meant no property for others, or 
the emerging of differing relations to production on the part of different social groups” 
(Leacock, introduction, 41). engels claims that, of the monogamous family, “it was 
the first form of the family to be based not on natural but on economic conditions—on 
the victory of private property over primitive, natural communal property” (engels, 
Origin of the Family, 128). quoting Marx, engels makes the case that the family is 
a paradigmatic economic institution: “the modern family contains in germ not only 
slavery, but also serfdom, since from the beginning it is related to agricultural services. 
it contains in miniature all the contractions which later extend throughout society and 
its state” (engels, Origin of the Family, 121–22). Despite the assertion that the family 
serves this unique role, this is not the entire explanation of the family offered by engels. 
Drawing a distinction between the proletarian and the bourgeois family, engels claims 
that monogamous marriage (and hence, family) is consented to for different purposes 
depending on social/economic class. For the proletarian family, sexual love between 
partners (a man and a woman) is a primary motivator for entering a monogamous rela-
tionship, and a primary sustainer of it. in contrast, for the bourgeois family, the primary 
motivation for entering a monogamous partnership is to secure patriarchal lineage with 
respect to property: a male could be certain of his parentage and could hence pass his 
property down to his kin (engels, Origin of the Family, 134–38). So, engels’s account 
of the family as a model for private property relations only applied to a subset of all 
families, and not to all families.
21. For instance, the belief in the holy trinity (the belief that God is three consub-
stantial persons the Father, the Son, and the holy Spirit) is shared among all those who 
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practice Roman catholicism. this holy trinity is a fundamental doctrine of the catholic 
faith; if a Roman catholic were to reject this doctrine, she would no longer be considered 
a practicing catholic (although she may still be considered a practicing christian), for 
she would not be able to practice (with true sentiment) portions of the catholic tradition, 
such as affirming the veracity of the holy trinity during Mass.
22. to continue the example in the previous endnote, when one attends Mass as a Ro-
man catholic, one would be right to assume that all other persons attending the Mass shared 
one’s belief in the holy trinity and valued the practice of affirming the holy trinity during 
Mass.
23. to be clear, my focus is upon what we consider our more immediate family 
members: not necessarily immediate in terms of biological proximity, but immediate in 
terms of the regularity of intimate interactions between family members.
24. brighouse and Swift, Family Values, 152.
25. For instance, think of a parent who believes that his or her child will suffer eternal 
damnation if the child does not believe in God.
26. by contrast, an understanding of the family that is based upon a commitment to 
interdependent caring relations would not endorse a system of beliefs that would conflict 
with the flourishing of individual members.
27. plato (Republic); Walzer (Spheres of Justice, 229).
28. For instance, protective interventionist policies rest upon descriptive notions of 
what constitutes a bad or problematic family. See olsen (“Myth of State intervention”).
29. hegel, Elements, § 173–77; see Landes (“hegel’s conception of the Family”); 
Locke (Some Thoughts, 25–26, 122–27).
30. Rawls (Theory of Justice); archard (Family).
31. hegel, Elements, § 294–97; Schwarzenbach, On Civic Friendship, 231–34.
32. almond (“Family Relationships”); Finnis (“Good of Marriage”); Sommers (“phi-
losophers against the Family”).
33. Gentry et al. (“expanding Kidney paired Donation”).
34. Velleman (“Family history”).
35. brighouse and Swift, Family Values, 158–60.
36. even if more intimate items were being traced, such as understandings and stories 
passed down through generations, we would not want to say that we share any qualita-
tive relationship with those genetic historical connections who are featured in the stories. 
Rather, we would say that those stories serve to deepen intimate connections with the 
closer relations who tell those stories to us.
37. While this might sound jarring to those who plan to inherit property or wealth 
from elder family members, i am not talking here about the direct transfer of inheritance 
through first- or even second-generation relations, such as parents to children or grand-
parents to children who actively seek to pass their wealth onto their progeny. instead, i 
am talking about claims made about having direct ties to property, artifacts, wealth, or 
the like that have no direct qualitative connection to the original owner—for instance, a 
person who seeks to inherit the wealth or estate of a late uncle or grandparent whom they 
PAQ 33_1 text.indd   84 1/15/19   11:08 AM
© Copyright 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. No part of this article may be 
reproduced, photocopied, posted online, or distributed through any means without the permission of the University of Illinois Press.
 What iS a FaMiLy? 85
did not know or who were not a part of their lives in any meaningful way. instead, we 
might think that property or wealth without an intended inheritor should go to the public 
domain rather than to a distant (or even not so distant), un-invested biological relative.
38. Relatedly, Rosalind hursthouse holds that there are familiar biological facts, 
widely known, that support the view that parenthood, motherhood, and childbearing are 
intrinsically worthwhile and partially constitutive of a flourishing human life (“Virtue 
ethics and abortion,” 241).
39. Fried, Right and Wrong, 154–55.
40. hegel, Elements, § 173; Kane, “on hegel,” 16.
41. Gavigan (“parent[ly] Knot”); Shanley (“Father’s Rights, Mother’s Wrongs?”). 
Relatedly, one could argue that part of the joy in parenting is found in parents noticing 
how their children look like them or seem to share similar dispositions. For parents of 
adoptive children or mixed-race children, a recognition of phenotypical difference often 
works to deepen bonds between parents and children that arise from the social implica-
tions of such differences (see haslanger, “you Mixed?”).
42. Slep and o’Leary (“parent and partner Violence”); hornor (“Domestic Violence 
and children”).
43. From this point onward, “family” will refer to the normative conception of the 
family that i will argue for.
44. it is worth noting here that we are never fully self-sufficient; even in times when 
we can provide for ourselves satisfactorily, we are still economically interdependent and 
dependent upon others for developing dynamic versions of ourselves (hegel, Elements, 
§ 190–95; Marx, “German ideology,” 222–23).
45. one might object: What about socialization or education? Doesn’t the family help 
to socialize individuals for the workplace, and educate them to be moral persons, or to 
speak a language? Maxine Greene argues that more comprehensive education is gained 
outside of the family, when we are able to engage in dialogue with those who challenge our 
worldview (Dialectic of Freedom). Similarly, hegel argues that socialization, especially 
for civil society and the needs of the market, cannot solely occur within the family, but 
must also be gained in civil society where persons are able to overcome the particular-
ity of the family for the universality of the market (hegel, Elements, § 190–95). So, the 
family is not the only, or necessarily the best, place for socialization or education.
46. tronto, Moral Boundaries, 108. in the case of infants and children, a similar level 
of knowledge about parents/caretakers would be gained over time as the infant/child 
develops.
47. Fagan (“Relationship between adolescent physical abuse”); narang and contreras 
(“Relationships of Dissociation”).
48. held, Ethics of Care, 48.
49. held, Ethics of Care, 49.
50. Due to a lack of space here, i cannot provide a thorough accounting of examples, 
but i can suggest a few: LGbtq youths, rejected or liberated from the groups in which 
they were raised, come together and develop, over time, intimate caring relations that are 
sustained in the long term; two cellmates in prison who come to develop, over time, inti-
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mate caring relations that are sustained even when one cellmate is freed; family members 
who, through years of intimate caregiving and care receiving, continually affirm their 
commitments to one another; and so on.
51. For those groups that are perpetually uncaring, as well as those social families that 
devolve over time into uncaring groups, intervention may be necessary to restore caring 
relations, as much as possible, to those persons who still wish to be members of the same 
family.
52. i am indebted to Virginia held for this distinction.
53. i have argued against this objection more thoroughly elsewhere. See Kane (“are 
children capable”).
54. See bratman (Faces of Intention); Gilbert (On Social Facts; Theory of Political 
Obligation); tuomela (Philosophy of Sociality).
55. Gould, Interactive Democracy, 39.
56. Gould, Interactive Democracy, 39.
57. tronto, Caring Democracy, 152.
58. See tuomela (Philosophy of Sociality, 62). Michael tomasello, through a series 
of social experiments that test for altruism and cooperation, has identified a naturally 
occurring cooperative tendency in small children. Specifically, he presents evidence that 
children, from around the time of their first birthday, are already helpful and cooperative 
in many situations, indicating some knowledge about the needs of others (tomasello, Why 
We Cooperate, 4).
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